In late July, a Canadian woman of Chinese descent was arrested in Belgium on serious charges of espionage for China while serving as an intern with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Canadian media have identified the woman as Biwei Zhang, also known professionally as Claire Zhang or Catina Zhang.
Reportedly born in China, she later became a naturalized Canadian citizen. Zhang has a background in systems engineering, computer science, and economics. Before starting her internship at NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium, in July 2025, Zhang worked at the Canadian Space Agency and Statistics Canada.
SHAPE is described as the central operational command hub for the 32-member NATO alliance. Zhang worked in the IT department. According to The Brussels Times, Zhang’s suspicious behaviors, including “excessive curiosity about her colleagues, a tendency to enter areas to which she was not authorised, and claims that she had accessed files outside her professional remit,” prompted SHAPE security to flag her and refer the case to Belgian intelligence.
Belgian authorities searched Zhang’s home and workplace at SHAPE before placing her in pretrial detention, which was later extended by one month. NATO has stated nothing of importance was compromised. Zhang has made no public comments on the espionage allegations but has appealed the detention order. A decision on her appeal is expected in the coming days.
Zhang’s espionage case is not an isolated security lapse. It is a symptom of a deeper reality: Canada does have a China problem, due to a security culture that has repeatedly subordinated rigorous vetting and threat assessment to commercial and diplomatic engagement with Beijing.
It is concerning because Canada is a member of the Five Eyes intelligence alliance, a longstanding partnership that also includes Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The alliance shares some of the world’s most sensitive intelligence, particularly signals intelligence (SIGINT), as well as information on foreign interference, cyber threats, espionage, and military developments. China is one of the primary targets of this collective effort. As Canada deepens economic and diplomatic ties with Beijing, despite clear evidence of screening failures and a pattern of prioritizing commercial interests, allies are entitled to ask whether Ottawa can still be trusted with the most sensitive intelligence.
Since Zhang’s arrest, The Globe and Mail has revealed a troubling “history of fraud.” While applying for a position at the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) in 2019, Zhang submitted two similar applications under different names and email addresses on the same day. This deceitful strategy allowed her to take the eligibility exam twice within 24 hours, apparently a blatant attempt to manipulate the hiring process. When “asked directly” about the double applications, Zhang refused to acknowledge what she had done. A 2023 investigation by the Public Service Commission confirmed the finding, which a federal court upheld in 2024. As a consequence, Zhang was mandated to complete an ethics course and inform the commission before accepting certain public service roles.
This finding occurred well before Zhang’s NATO internship. Still, Global Affairs Canada granted Zhang the necessary security clearance for the SHAPE role after assessments from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and criminal-record checks by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). It is alarming that her documented fraud and use of dual identities did not prompt more rigorous scrutiny or result in the denial of clearance for a sensitive posting with allies.
Since NATO relies on member states to conduct security checks and clearances for their personnel, Zhang’s case has raised serious questions about Canada’s security screening processes for government-linked roles and internships at sensitive international organizations.
Public Safety Minister Gary Anandasangaree has pledged a review of security screening protocols to uncover the facts behind this situation. Whether that review produces meaningful change remains uncertain.
In his recent newsletter, China specialist Sam Cooper pointed out that Global Affairs Canada, the agency responsible for granting security clearance to Zhang despite her history of fraud and multiple identities, was headed by Deputy Minister David Morrison from October 2022 to March 2026. Morrison was then promoted to senior diplomatic and international affairs advisor to Prime Minister Mark Carney. Morrison, along with his former minister Mélanie Joly, has a documented record of prioritizing trade and diplomatic engagement with Beijing over national-security concerns. This approach was not unique to them; it reflected a broader tendency within the left-wing Canadian government.
In June 2023, Cooper revealed a draft National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians report finding that Canadian leaders frequently ranked “trade and political objectives over security concerns.” That prioritization has been linked to a pattern of discounting warnings from Canada’s spy agency that Beijing is the “’foremost perpetrator’ of foreign interference in Canada,” as well as to allegations of Chinese interference in Canadian elections and political processes between 2019 and 2022.
Since Carney came into office, he has been positioning Canada for closer ties with China, seeking to reduce dependence on the United States while resisting pressures from the Trump administration. In January 2026, Carney made the first official visit to China by a Canadian prime minister since 2017. He and Chinese leader Xi Jinping announced a new strategic partnership emphasizing trade, energy collaboration, and “cultural exchanges.”
As part of the arrangement, Canada will allow limited imports of Chinese electric vehicles, up to 49,000 units at a reduced tariff rate of 6.1 percent, down from 100 percent. This decision comes despite repeated U.S. warnings about security risks “related to data collected and transmitted by modern [Chinese] vehicles.” Following the announcement, U.S. Ambassador to Canada Pete Hoekstra stated that Chinese electric vehicles imported into Canada will not be allowed to cross the U.S. border.
Zhang’s case is a warning: Until Ottawa rebuilds credible screening, prioritizes national-security considerations over short-term commercial gains, and demonstrates it can protect shared allied secrets, partners — especially the United States — should reasonably limit what they share.
